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CONSCIENCE, SYMPATHY AND LOVE: ETHICAL STRATEGIES




The problem generally with "intuitively
certain-' or "self-evident" truths is that
they often are not certain or self-evident to
anv but their author. Hence, intuitive
knbwledge has frequently been attacked
on epistemological grounds as not certain,
and-in many cases, as not constituting
knowledge. In the forthcoming pages it
will be shown how Schopenhauer's proof
that the world is will rests on just such an
intuitive base. As such, his proofs are not
entirely satisfying. But Schopenhauer
himself admits that explanation by its very
nature must reach a point beyond which it
cannot go; that all explanation leaves
something unexplained; that all accounts
of the world leave unexplained a qualitas
occulta. This does not, however, change
the fact that his argument in support of the
assertion that the world is will remains
somewhat dissatisffing. The acceptance
or rejection of Schopenhauer's philosophy
ultimately rests on the acceptance or re-
jection of this, his (not entirely satis$ing)
explanation of explanation.
Howeveq whereas Book Two of the first
volume of The Worl.d as Will and Repre-
sentation contains these proofs-that expla-
nation cannot be ultimate and the world is
(known in some intuitive way as) will-it
is my contention that Schopenhauer, in
Book Four, offers yet more support for his
metaphysical assertions. I shall seek to
illustrate how his writings on conscience,
sympathy, and love (contained in his ethi-
cal writings) can serve, whether Scho-
penhauer intended them to do so or not, as
aAAitional strategies toward confirmation
of his metaphysical assertions in Book
Tlvo of The World as Will and Representa-
rlon. Schopenhauer's intention with re-
gard to this matter is, though hardly irrele-
vant. rather indiscernible. Even so, the
textual evidence is such that I would like
to think Schopenhauer well aware of the
meaning, both from a philosophical and a
literary-perspective, oi the stiiking inter-
relatedness of his metaphysical and ethical
doctrines, and how one facet of his
thought could be easily utilized, if not as
proof of the other (for to do so would risk
I circle instead of resulting in simple radi-
cal interrelatedness), at least in an illustra-
tive, heuristic way suggestive of its credi-
bilitv.
In the preface to the first edition of The
World as Will and Representatio,n Scho-
penhauer states with regard to his great
work that: "What is to be imparted by it is
a single thought." And the reader imme-
diately wonders what this thought is-a
thought that required, in 1818, a large
volume (and, we are told, a second read-
ing of that volume) for its proper imparta-
tion, and then, in 1844, a second volume
of comparable size yet added to that re-
quirement-all for the communication of
a single thought. The thought itself is sim-
olv stated: The world is will.Indeed Scho-
i"ntrauet repeats this thought again and
asain. But what, one wonders, is the con-
te-nt of the thought? This of course is what
occupies the two volumes of The World as
lYill and Representation and is the founda-
tion for the whole of Schopenhauer's phi-
losophy; it seems one cannot accept Scho-
penhauer's notion of the world as will
without also accepting the rest of his sys-
tem (at least, that is what he seeks to per-
suade the reader), and, vice versa, one
cannot accept any particular facet of his
thought without at the same time accept-
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ing the notion of the world as will (this
because of the radical interrelation be-
tween his metaphysical assertions and all
subsequent philosophical elaboration-
perhaps a manifestation of any system of
thought espousing an idealistic monism).
Hence "the world is will" is the root and
foundation for Schopenhauer's aesthetic,
political, and ethical thought.
But it is here the content of "the world is
will" must be questioned. What leads
Schopenhauer to this notion? And how
much credibility or, in current terminol-
ogy, what sort of validity does his notion
have?
Schopenhauer's admiration for Kant is
renowned, and it is precisely the problems
he found in Kantian philosophy that serve
as a departure for his own system. The
origins of Schopenhauerean thought lie
along a decidedly Kantian line and depict
representation and its relation to the prin-
ciple of suff,rcient reason as the basis and
origin for any inquiry concerned with
knowledge. Furthermore, both men felt
deeply the desire to know the thing-in-
itself.'But, whereas Kant could not set
beyond the representation, whereas in tl-re
Kantian system anything underlying or
prompting representations must lie out-
side of those representations and hence
outside of human comprehension, Scho-
penhauer felt the need both to know those
things-in-themselves andthat it is possible
to give an account of how we do know
them. His philosophy as a whole is such
an account.
We want to know the significance of those rep-
resentations; to ask whether this world is noth-
ing more than representation. In that case, it
would inevitably pass by like an empty dream,
or a ghostly vision not worth our consider-
ation. Or we ask whether it is something else,
something in addition, and if so what that
something is.'
Schopenhauer begins his search for sig-
nificance by considering the body as rep-
resentation. Surely one has a representa-
tion of one's body as existing subject to
the principle of sufficient reason?: I can
see my body, that is, I perceive my body
as existing in space and time and as having
a causal relationship with other objects. I
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have a representation of my body as an
object in a world with other objects. But it
seems that I am more than a mere bodv. a
mere object-that there is something
which differentiates myself from mere
representation. Schopenhauer calls this
something "will."
To the subject ofknowing, who appears as an
individual only through his identity with the
body, this body is given in two entirely differ-
ent ways. It is given in intelligent perception as
representation, as an object among objects, lia-
ble to the laws of these objects. But it is also
given in quite a different way, namely as what
is known immediately to everyone, and is de-
noted by the word will.2
There is an immediacy when I look for
myself that is not present, it would seem,
when I regard representations of external
objects. The will is this immediacy. As
such, Schopenhauer would claim, it is not
mediated in any way; space, time, and
causality do not shape it as they do repre-
sentations; it is not itself a representation
but, rather, it is the ground of representa-
tion, the conditioning possibility of repre-
sentation. Schopenhauer's appeal to the
individual and the individual's experience
of his own body is well-founded .It would
seem, at first. that our bodv has more
significance than other repiesentations.
Schopenhauer simply terms this special
significance will. And because it is unme-
diated, because it is the thing laid bare, it
is therefore an in-itself: the thing-in-itself.
It is just this double knowledge of our own
body which gives us information about the
body itself, about its action and movement fol-
lowing on motives, as well as about its suffer-
ing through outside impressions, in a word,
about what it is, not as representation, but as
something over and above this, and hence what
it is in itself. We do not have such imrnediate
information about the nature. action. and suf-
fering of any other real objects.3
From this we can conclude that lzy self
is will. and thus that will is the in in-itsetf
of myself; that I am immediately aware o?
the noumenal reality which forms the pos-
sibility of my objectihcation in the phe-
nomenal realm. In this way, contraKant,I
am aware of a thing-in-itself. But this will,
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this thine-in-itself remains singular' It is
vet onlv-an individual wtll-' 
Thuifar Schopenhauer has arrived at a
verv solipsistic position or. as he calls it, a
position bf theoretical egoism. This posi-
iion has been distasteful throughout the
history of philosophy-.and is one which
Schopenhauer as-well seeks to avoid'
Howiver. he acknowledges,the futility. of
trvins to invalidate such a posltlon
thiou-gh philosoPhical Proofs.
Theoretical egoism, of course, can never be
retuted by proofs, yet in philosophy it has
never been positively used otherwise than as a
skeptical sophism, i.e., for the sake of appear-
un"i. A" a serious conviction, on the other
hand, it could be found only in a madhouse; as
such it would then need not so much a refuta-
tion as a cure.4
What must occur if we are to avoid sol-
iosism is for the outside material world,
and not simply our individual body, to^
have a degree bf inner significance itself
so that it is not merely representatlon anc
hence actually erists (assuming we are al-
lowed to use such vocabulary in reference
to an object transcending the Principle of
Sufficient Reason) outside of our repte-
sentations, thus making a solipsistic ac-
count of self and reality infeasible' By
allowine this, by requiring this, Scho-
penhau6r not only claims that I am will'
but also the world is will.
If we wish to attribute the greatest known real-
ity to the material world' which immediately
eiists only in our representation, then we give
it that reaiity which our own body has for each-
of us, for to each of us this is the most real of
things. But if now we analyze the reality of this
body and its actions, then, beyond the fact that
it is our representation, we find nothing in it
but the will; with this even its reality is ex-
hausted. Therefore we can nowhere find an-
other kind of reality to attribute to the material
world. fi therefore, the material world is to be
somethi.ng more than our mere represenlation'
we must say that, besides being the representa-
tion, and hence in itself and of its inmost na'
ture, it is what we find immediately in our-
selves as will's
It must be emphasized that this inner
significance is nbt a representation and
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thus is nor subject to the principle of suffi-
cient reason. It is therefbre not ratlonally
knowable but is immediate or self-evident
in some sense. Though Schopenhauer fre-
quentlv says that we know the wlll' thls
dse ofihe ierm 
'know' is quite a different
(and elusive) sense from what we nor-
mally mean by the term. This "knowl-
edse-" is not ralional or representational-
of ihat we can be certain from the text. But
is it empirical? This is a rather difficult
question to answer. He does indeed claim
that aoprehension of the will is a poste-
riori."'but what could it mean to say that I
have an experience of something that is
aspatial, atemporal, and is not affected in
a iausal wav? This is to use "experience"
in a very novel and strange sense. And so'
Schopenhauer's use of the term "knowl-
edsel' with regard to the will would be'
p16pe r l y  speak ing .  a  m iss ta temen t
tthoueh 6ne whictr. due to the functioning
of laiguage, would be a necessary one
were Sch6penhauer to properly achieve
communication of his Point).'
Briefly then, Schopenhauer's strategy
in rejecting the Kantian ignorance of nou-
menal reality and subsequent assertlon
that the worid is wil l runs thus: (l) The
world is representation, and hence my
bodv is representationl (2) My body is not
merLly representation but it seems to have
an inner'significance-a signifrcance..of
which I am-aware immediately; (3) Solip-
sism is a position we should avoid; (4) If
we are to ivoid solipsism then the material
world must not merely be (my) represen-
tation but, rather, like the body' it ryy9t
have its own inner significance; (5) This
inner significance is will.
Schopienhauer's assertions can be criti-
cized on several counts. First, he seems to
have a questionable reading of Kant' Cer-
tain passages in the first volume of The
WorM as iyiil ana Representation seem to
isnore the fact that Kant had offered
D"roofs for, at least, the existence of the
ihine-in-itselfprecisely in order that a sol-
ipsiitic position could be avoided. These
droofs are contained. in the Critique of
Pure Reason, in the Transcendental Ana-
lvtic. specifically within the chapter ex-
ooundine the Postulates of Empirical
thoushtls well as in the Paralogisms of
26
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Pure Reason.s Briefly, Kant's proof runs
thus: (1) I am aware of myself as existing
in time; (2) Time is a function of how we
come to have representations; (3) Time
determinations are possible only relative
to something stable or permanent outside
of those time determinations; (4) Some-
thing in-itself exists outside of the time
determined representation of myself that
forms the basis-the possibility-for me
to have such a time determination. I see
no reason why Schopenhauer could not
have cited these proofs to his own beneht.
Their conspicuous absence from his dis-
cussion may lead the reader to wonder
whether he understood Kant as, in some
sense, maintaining a position of theoreti-
cal egoism.
A second major criticism is that there is
no reason to suppose the inner signifi-
cance of the material world is the same as
the inner significance we frnd in our-
selves. Insofar as we must attribute to the
material world an "inner sisnificance" to
avoid solipsism, it is similir to what we
frnd in ourselves. But the inner signifi-
cance of the material world could be dif-
ferent from our own. It could have its own
distinctive significance utterly alien from
our inner significance. Supposedly, Scho-
penhauer demands the inner significance
of the world and of ourselves be the same
to avoid solipsism, but he offers no proof
for this claim. It is, as he says, an assump-
tion.
However, Schopenhauer has conceded
that, not only can a reasonnot be given for
the fact that the inner significance of the
world is the same as the inner significance
of our body. but that we cannot give a
reason or make a rationally valid k;:'owl-
edge claim with regard to how we "know"
our own inner significance in the first
place. In the second volume of The World
as Will and Representation he makes this
explicit.
. . . I have stressed that other truth that we are
not merely the knowing subject, but that we
ourselves are also among those realities or en-
tities we require to know, that we ourselves are
the thing-in-itsef. Consequently a way from
within stands open to us to that real nature of
things to which we cannot penetrate from with-
out.e
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The mystery of this inner way, this elu-
sive epistemology (if that is the correct
term) is the crux of the problem with
Schopenhauer's assertion that the world is
will. We want to be able to validate (or
invalidate) his claim-a claim, that he
claims, is so immediate, so given to expe-
rience as to be untouchable by logical/
rational/philosophical inquiry (or media-
tions). It is upon the acceptance or
non-acceptance of this fundamental in-
sight, this single thought, that the whole
ofSchopenhauer's ystem stands, or falls.
Schopenhauer's "proofs" that the
world is will are, on his own admission,
not entirely satisfying. However, in the
fourth book of volume one of The WorM as
Will and Representation it is my conten-
tion that Schopenhauer offers additional
proof that the world is will through his
discussion of lived states or what may be
referred to as existential realizations of the
world as will. In Book Two Schopenhauer
founded his argument on an intuitive base.
In Book Four he offers experierzces which
serve as realizations of the world as will.
These experiences are conscience, sym-
pathy, and love. It is also interesting to
note, considering our adoption of termi-
nology, e.g., "existential," that Scho-
penhauer mentions the notion of dread rn
a passage that is directly relevant to our
discussion. It is with this brief mention
that we shall begin, since it serves as a
prelude to the other three.
In Section 63, Schopenhauer defines
eternal justice as that which "rules not the
State but the world. " It is not retributive
justice, as in the justice of the State, but
ratheq it is the justice of existence itself.n
It is in this context, that of eternal justice,
that Schopenhauer notes that a state of
dread (Grausen) exists in the world or, at
least, that it is part of the human condi-
tion.
When the form of knowledee is called
into question, whenthe Princifium Indivi-
duationis is felt to be undermined in some
way, when one is led to question phenom-
enal existence itself, dread arises. Scho-
penhauer likens Man's clinging to the
Principle of Sufficient Reason to the cling-




Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trust-
ing his frail craft in the stormy sea that is
boundless in every direction, rising and falling
with the howling, mountainous waves, so in the
midst of a world full of suffering and misery
the individual man calmly sits, supported by
and trusting the principium Individuntionis, or
the way in which the individual knows things
as phenomenon.rl
On occasion, Man wonders at the futil-
ity of his knowledge. This confusion, this
estrangement from the Principle of Suffi-
cient reason is dread.
From this presentiment arises that ineradicable
dread, common to all human beings (and pos-
sibly even to the more intelligent animals),
which suddenly seizes them, when by any
other of its forms seems to undergo an excep-
tion. For example, when it appears that some
change has occurred without a cause, or a de-
ceased person exists again; or when in any
other way past or the future is present, or the
instant is near. The fearful terror at anything of
this kind is based on the fact that they suddenly
become puzzlel over the forms of knowledge
of the phenomenon which alone hold their own
individuality separate from the rest of the
world. This separation, however, lies only in
the phenomenon and not in the thing-in-it-
self.r2
Dread is confusion over phenomenal,
individual existence. Dread is a realiza'
tion of tutility-the tutility of the individ-
ual in the face of the whole. The object of
dread is the thing-in-itself, and the thing-
in-itself is beyond all objectivity. This
seeming contradiction, that the object of
dread is not an object in the normal sense
since it transcends all objectivity, is what
distinguishes dread from mere confusion
or fear. The object of dread cannot be
discussed, analyzed, or in any way ration-
ally explicated. It is the thing-in-itself.
Hence it can be said that dread is a sudden
insight, a realization of the thing-in-it-
self-of the will.
The relationship which holds between
dread and its "object," is analogous to
that which holds between conscience and
what prompts conscience. It is with con-
science, and later with sympathy and love,
that Schopenhauer offers a practical or
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ethical proof for the existence of an under-
lying will. Schopenhauer claims that,
from a moral standpoint, if we consider
what a guilty conscience or the "sting of
conscience" (Gewissensangst) is, we will
find that it is the feeling brought about or
the result of performing an evil act. This is
a rather commonsensical observation.
What is interesting about Schopenhauer's
claim regarding conscience is the reason
why it arises. Why does one often feel
guilty after causing harm to another? Why
is there a guilty conscience at all?
Schopenhauer claims that the guilty
conscience is a realization that the world
is will. It is an insight, on the part of the
morally evil agent, that his actions in-
crease the sufTering of another and in
some way increase his own suffering as
well; his conscience makes him suffer. In
this way the Principium Individuationis is
bridged resulting in a grasp ofthe world as
will. The evil man feels himself harmed in
some way by his own actions. This feeling
is a recognition that, on some level, he
and his victim are one.
He has a presentiment that, however much
time and space separate him from other indi-
viduals and the innumerable miseries they suf-
fer, indeed suffer through him; however much
time and space present these as quite foreign to
him, yet in themselves and apart from the rep-
resentations and its forms, it is the one will-to-
live appearing in them all which, failing to
recognize itselfhere, turns its weapons against
itself, and, by seeking increased well-being in
one of its phenomena, imposes the greatest
suffering on another. He dimly sees that he,
the bad person, is precisely this whole will;
that in consequence he is not only the tormen-
tor but also the tormented, from whose suffer-
ing he is separated and kept free only by a
delusive dream, whose form is space and
t ime.13
Schopenhauer presents the pangs of
consclence as an rmmediate awareness of
the world as will, the thing-in-itself. But
he also presents the good conscience in
the same light.
The opposite of the sting of conscience . . is
the good conscience, the satisfaction we feel
after every disinterested eed. It springs from
28
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the fact that such a deed, as arising from the
direct recognition of our own inner being-in-
itself in the phenomenon of another, again af-
fords us the verification of this knowledge, of
the knowledge that our true self exists not only
in our own person, in this particular phenome-
non, but in everything that lives.t4
Thus Schopenhauer presents both the
good and the guilty conscience as some-
how verifying his claim that the world is
will. Exactly how this verification is
achieved remains problematic. Again,
Schopenhauer would say that such knowl-
edge is immediately given or intuitively
certain. What is important here, however,
is not how "the world is will" is verified,
but that Schopenhauer claims, through the
conscience, ir is verified. Schopenhauer
offers no innovation here with regard to
what he had previously offered as proof
that the world is will in Book Two. What
is innovative about his writings on con-
science is that he points to a specific expe'
rience which he claims is proof that we
can know or directly apprehend the nature
of the thing-in-itself. Further in Book
Four, Schopenhauer points to two other
experiences that serve as verification of
his metaphysical assertion as well. These
two experiences are sympathy and love.
At the end of Section 66 Schopenhauer
states: "All love is compassion or sympa-
thy. "" Section 67 then serves as clarifica-
tion of what Schopenhauer means by sym-
patfi (MitleiQ. Given the great degree of
internal coherence and consistency of his
work it is not surprising that sympathy is
the acknowledgement of others' suffering
based on the recognition of our own suf-
fering and the likeness of the two; we feel
sympathetic for another because we rec-
ognize that person's suffering as analo-
sous to our orrvn.- 
Schopenhauer further states that this
sympathy is love.
Whatever goodness, affection, and magnanim-
ity do for others is always only an alleviation of
their sufferings; and consequently what can
move them to good deeds and to works of af-
fection is always only knowledge ofthe suffer'
ing of others, directly intelligible from one's
own suffering, and put on a level therewith. It
follows from this, however, that pure affection
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(caritas) is of its nature sympathy or compas-
sion. The suffering alleviated by it, to which
every unsatisfied esire belongs, may be great
or small. We shall therefore have no hesitation
in saying that the mere concept is as unfruitful
for genuine virtue as it is for genuine art; that
all true and pure affection is sympathy or com-
passion, and all love that is not sympathy is
selfishness.r6
The objection may be raised that Scho-
penhauer has been inconsistent. Whereas
he previously stated that "all love is com-
passion or sympathy, " in the passage just
cited he seems to say that there is a type of
love that is nol sympathetic-a love that is
purely selfish. Whereas sympathetic love
is based on our knowledge of others' suf-
fering, selfish love-love of or for one's
self-is based solely on knowledge of per-
sonal suffering. But such love remains
sympathetic; it is sympathetic to personal
suffering. It is sympathy with one's self
and one's own situation; it is of course,
possible to feel pity for one's self. This,
however, may be stretching the meaning of
sympathy too far. There are other grounds
though for rejecting Schopenhauer's
seeming inconsistency. What has not yet
been pointed out is that Schopenhauer has
been presenting different aspects of the
same thing.
Throughout his discussion of sympathy
Schopenhauer tries to maintain two sepa-
rate stances, two perspectives on the mat-
ter. First he presents knowledge of others'
suffering as primary, then knowledge of
personal suffering as primary. But, Scho-
penhauer will argue, such individual per-
spectives depend on fragmentation of a
larger more comprehensive perspective.
This larger perspective is suffering in gen-
eral-not necessarily the suffering of oth-
ers, or personal suffering, but suffering
itself .
Sympathy and love, and conscience,
and dread for that matter, are all experi-
ences governed by the Principium Indivi-
duationis; they are events in the phenome-
nal world. But they are human events or
emotions that, so Schopenhauer main-
tains, somehow lead beyond themselves.
This t ranscendence,  is  what  Scho-
penhauer claims is the intuitive apprehen-
29
DIALOGUE
sion of the world as will. And such appre-
hension is not governed by the Principle of
Sufficient Reaion. Hence it is impossible
to adequately discern what the ground of
such eiperidnce is. for it Iies beyond. all
obrectivjty. Such a ground, however, is a
neiessary con dition for these experiences'
That ihis interPretation of Scho-
penhauer's thought is sound. that these
human experiences are intimately con-
nected wilh the will, and that Scho-
oenhauer would want moral experience to
*erve as further evidence in favor of his
assertion that the world is will-these are
later confirmed in a few passages of his
essav "On Ethics" in Volume Two of The
Worid as will and Representatio,n. With
reeard to the intimate connection between
m6rahty and metaphysics Schopenhauer
states:
Moral investigations are incomparably more
important han physical, and in general than all
other; this follows from the fact that they al-
most immediately concern the thing-in-itself,
namely that phenomenon of it which, directly
discovered by the light of knowledge, it reveals
i$ true nature as will.l1
Aeain, Schopenhauer does not offer an
exolination of what constitutes this reve-
lation but only that, in the moral realm,
such a revelation does indeed occur. Scho-
penhauer later explicitly states that sym-
oathv is a key expertence ln the recognl-
iionbf the world is will. He does this in a
nesative way, reminiscent of lknt. by
shSwing thaithe will as thing-in-itself is a
conditi6n for the sympathetic experience'
On this metaphysical identiry of the will as
thing-in-itself rest in general three phenomena,
in spite of the infinite multiplicity of its appeg-
ances, and these three can be brought under
the common concept of sympathy: (l) sympa-
thy or compassion, which is, as I have shown,
the basis ofjustice and philanthropy, caritas;
(2'l sexrul love, with capricious selection,
amor, whtch is the life of the species, assertlng
its precedence over that of individuals; (3)
-ofir,to which also belong animal magnetism
and sympathetic ures. Accordingly, sympathy^
is to be defined as the empirical appearance ot
the will's metaphysical identity' through the
physical multiplicity of its phenomena'r8
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It is in this passage that Schopenhauer
most closely comes to presenting a. human
exDerience as proof for his assertion that
th6 world is witt. It must be noted here
that Schopenhauer's conception of con-
science alio easily fits into such a proof' It
will be remembered that conscience, for
Schopenhauer, was the result of an imme-
diate realization that all is one, that the
human realm is not so sharply divided into
atomistic units called "persons" as it
would. prima facie, seem to be. Con-
science is a syhpathetic notion as well:
the person wiih a guilty conscience feels
sympathy for the suffering of his v.ictim'
Likewise the person with a good con-
science realizes that his acts were
prompted or were in sympathy with the
well-beine of others.
Dread,-on the other hand, is not so eas-
ii Arie toitre fact that, whereas the sympa-
thetic experience retains a somewhat
hisher degree of the Principium Indivi-
diationis.-i.e., the true relationship be-
tween the moral agent and other living
creatures is realized while the moral agent
remains an individual, on the other hand
in a dreadfuI situation the moral agent's
individuality completely dissolves. Dread
is thus a fi'r moie radical, violent, and
shocking experience than sympathy. But I
think it dan 6learly be seen how both expe-
riences serve to support Schopenhauer's
claim in some way that the world is will'
The objection migtrt. quite- rightly.. be
raised thai I experience myself as will just
as much as when I experience, say, sym-
oathv-that the experience of myself'rorn6tto* 
"gives" the will whereas the
svmpathetic experience presupposes lt'
fnis is undoubtedly true within Scho-
Denhauer's system. But the problem for'schopenhauei. 
and the specific p-oint.l
havebeen trying to make. is that if he is
soins to claim some sort of intuitive im-
hediacv as the ground of his assertion that
the woild is w-ill, and if he is going to
ilv subsumed under the general heading of
oi,--orhrr cs nonqcience and love are. Thissy mpathY,as :"1'-?i:^":: 3:9 i:v-eL :1". ; lI'
attempt al account of that immediacy,
then he is going to need a very powerful  rful
heuristic device to convince those skeptics
who fail to "see" the substance of his
claim. What has been brought out and em-
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phasized in the preceding pages is pre-
cisely the way that Schopenhauer, rather
ingeniously to my mind, uses emotional
or moral states, e.9., dread, conscience,
sympathy, love, as compelling psychical
heuristic devices to lead us to an immedi-
ate intuitive realization of all he means by
"the world is will"-that through thes-e
states we can somehow begin to "see"
what he means and that onc6 we thus be-
gin to empathize we can "throw away the
ladder" so to speak and attain a non-ra-
tional, non-representational insight that
the world is will.
In short and more generally. my pur-
pose has been, not to depict Schopenhauer
as a precursor to the existentialist philoso-
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phers of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries (although what I have said, as
well as his well-known influence on
Nietzsche, will attest to his importance to
that movement), but rather to show how
his assertion that the world is will has
slightly more credibility if it is understood
with regard to, not merely his intuitive
claims in Book Two, but his presentation
and explication of existentially significant
lived states in Book Four. With these states
in mind his claim would seem to be. if not
vindicated, at least more substantial, more
worthy of serious consideration by those
who would dismiss it as a claim based
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